mechanism design
Mechanism design is a branch of economics. It aims to design rules (also called "mechanisms" or "game forms") that enable autonomous/decentralized realization of goals in areas such as resource allocation and public decision making, given a goal to be realized in the form of a function. Wikipedia The only social choice rule that does not exclude a particular candidate and satisfies strategicity when society's preferences are determined by voting among three or more candidates is the dictatorship rule. Social Choice and Mechanism Design
Arrow's theorem
Pair Majority Voting
Condorcet winner
voting paradox
majority voting rule
Boulder Voting Rules
Borda winner
preference
preference order
Social welfare function
universal domain
unanimity
UPP
UPR
IIA: Independence from irrelevant alternatives
non-dictatorship
Arrow's theorem: Nothing exists that satisfies these four conditions
Proof by Blau
Unanimity = group rationality and freedom of choice = individual rationality are in conflict
Boulder Voting Rules Do Not Satisfy IIA
Cautionary Voter Theorem
strategic operability
Democratic voting rules can be strategically manipulated
Supply Mechanisms for Public Goods
street light problem
Transaction Mechanisms
Incentive Compatibility
Nash Execution Mechanism
matching theory
Stable Marriage Issues
Strategic Operations
Goethe's royalty system
second-price auction
general impossibility theorem
Hurwitz's impossibility theorem
Groves Mechanism
pivotal mechanism
Nash Execution Mechanism
Walker Mechanism
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